In
additions to a typologic analysis, as the central subject matter, the
author briefly considers also some significant doctrinal features on the
low intensity conflict. On the basis of examples of conflicts in the
contemporary world he analyses the latest doctrinal trends of the USA,
the USSR, and some other countries, regarding this likely future
military strategy. The author maintains that the cognizance of all
doctrinal trends regarding the low intensity conflict create the basis
for considering the necessity of building-up and perfecting our total
national defense and social self-protection concept, as well as
for foreseeing a possible model of forces of a possible aggressor in a
low intensity conflict launched against the SFRY, i. e. for our
searching for an adequate model of our armed forces that will be capable
for deterring the aggressor or containing an aggression.
THE LOW INTENSITY
CONFLICT (book edited by PRO-ANDY,
Andrej Ivanuša s.p., Maribor, July 2007)
SPOPAD NIZKE INTENZIVNOSTI (knjiga izšla
20.julija 2007 pri založbi PRO-ANDY, Andrej Ivanuša s.p., Maribor)
At
the end of 2006 on web site MORS I saw that the writers of Slovene
military doctrine also entered a concept of low intensity conflict.
Because I do not find that anybody wrote meaning of this concept, I
decided to inform and publish my own written examination for
General-Major about the doctrine of low intensity conflict.
In
1989 I passed on an examination to General-Major with the same subject –
influencing the doctrine of low intensity conflict on the combat
construction of the Yugoslav People Army (JLA). I was the second general
of the JLA who did an examination of this theme, and so I mean that I
was a first-class expert in this new military doctrine. Another reason
for publishing this text was the fact that till 1991 only for generals
and admirals was not permit to publish their own examination projects,
in the meantime others published his doctorates and masters.
So
all the visitors of my web site will have an exceptional chance to see
how a general examination degree looks like: Namely, in the JLA it was
composed of two parts: a practical and a theoretical examination. First,
I had a practical examination in commanding a trip in Lika, from Gospić
to Kočevje. I got a positive mark and after that I prepared for the
theoretical examination.
But I
had some problems, because my first mentor died. And the new mentor, a
very good military specialist, was not satisfied with my topic, so I had
to revise my some of my conclusions. At the end I got a very good mark.
After three months I was promoted to Major-General. But some of the
conclusions I obtained in my general examination were contrary to
practice. When I heard in September 1990 that an attack against Slovenia
will take place, I claimed to be retired. This general essay is a
complete demonstration of a new doctrine of low intensity conflict, with
my own conclusions how to fight it.
The
head of JLA was warned and a former agent of the CIA informed me that
the CIA and the Dia were also interested in it.
INTELLIGENCE-SECURITY PROTECTION OF THE MARCH OF THE 14th DIVISION
OF THE NACIONAL LIBERATION ARMY AND SLOVENE PARTISAN UNITS TO ŠTAJERSKA
(Draft for a security study)
OBVEŠČEVALNO-VARNOSTNA ZAŠČITA POHODA 14. DIVIZIJE NOV IN PO SLOVENIJE
NA ŠTAJERSKO (Skica za varnostno študijo), Borec, štev. 561–563/1998,
Ljubljana
In a
draft for a security study the author has condensed scattered fragments
on intelligence-security preparations for the march of the 14th Division
to Štajerska and on protection during the march. This is the first
attempt at an overall treatment of the subject, which the author
describes as a »prohibited« topic!
The
author, an expert on security issues, has systematically examined
intelligence personnel and participants in the march, and talked with
some of them at length. In doing so he was following his theory that the
march demanded many casualties (more than 50 per cent) not so much
because of tactical / operational errors and the appalling winter
conditions, but because of poor intelligence / security preparations and
protection, an almost total lack of coordination with
intelligence / security bodies in the field, and negligence with regard to
counter-intelligence protection in the units.
In
the details published in the memoirs the author includes in special
supplements that there was a carefully placed German (Gestapo) agent in
each of the three brigades, and that the Germans set up a special
police / counterintelligence system in Štajerska. For this reason the
author also doubts that the demonstrative march across Croatia (with ten
skirmishes and a mass of rallies!) was a surprise to the Germans.
The
author rightly claims that counterintelligence mistakes cannot be »put
right« by the heroism of the fighters and their commanders. Of course
only when German archives (Gestapo, Abwehr, Sicherheitsdienst) are
accessible to the public will it be possible to establish more,
certainly all, the dimensions of intelligence penetration of the units
of the 14th Division (which is also why this is only a draft for a
study). The author, interestingly, does not give too much credence to
the statements of exposed and executed agents! We would have to agree
with him that later reconstructions unequivocally showed that some
statements were obtained by force and also that many liquidated
»infiltrators and Gestapo men« were in fact innocent (e. g. in Bračič's
brigade, which was later admitted by the commander of the 14th
Division).
THE
BALKAN MILITARY RANGE (Military-security records)
BALKANSKI VOJAŠKI POLIGON (Vojaško-varnostni zapisi), Borec, štev.
567–569/1998, Ljubljana
The
author tackled a topical subject from our recent past, which would
probably meet with different responses. In three round up chapters which
are logically supplemented and interlaced with short biographic inserted
pieces, he introduces the causes and chronology of significant events
from 1945 to 1995 in Balkan and Yugoslavia respectively.
He
presents three destablities in Social Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRJ), namely: the first, the western (under the code Express) from
1945 to 1947 (unsuccessful), the second, the eastern (informbiro) from
1948 do 1952 (unsuccessful) and detail the third, the western (according
to the plan D-day), in the period from 1980 to 1995, which ended in a
bloody war and disintegration of SFRJ. The author gives proof of the
daring thesis that in a so-called directed and guided destability, which
was implemented by the methodology of the current military doctrine of
encounters of low intensity, the outer factors have always had decisive
predominance over the interior ones. By giving the sampling from other
parts of the world he clearly presents how a certain Superpower with a
prepared scenario and in accordance with its doctrine had intervened in
the events and forced their will on the nationalistic brawlers in the
Balkan public house. He announces also the similar course of events at
the other centre, in Kosovo.
Counterintelligence service of Yugoslav People’s army (KOS JLA), which
had in the fifties successfully protected Yugoslav Army and the state,
is for the first time in a condense way presented to the Slovenian
public. The numbers and security-political estimation from the
classified documents can not present all the efforts of KOS to defend
the former common country. The author tries to demystify the role and
importance of KOS and later security service of Yugoslav People's Army (JLA)
in which he had been working for nearly thirty years. The security
service of JLA faced the inglorious and duet to the same reason as JLA
did: it took the wrong strategic and political security estimation
namely, that it is possible to impose your own political will on other
nations.
The
second part includes an interesting genesis of the attacks on the JLA
between 1942 and 1991 in which many interesting details are found. He
introduces the post-Titov period from 1980 to 1990 and the main elements
of the plan-D for the disintegration of the SFRJ. The author could not
elude the Process against the four in which he played the role of a
»deprived party«. With a survey of published and not published
inscriptions as well as by publishing three classified documents of the
JLA for the first time, he persuasively proves that the process against
the four was neither political nor set up from the JLA side. It must
have been the process which was imposed on the JLA in the framework of
the general plan of compromitation of the KOS.
In
the third chapter the author, in a condensed way and proved by
documents, introduces the theoretical basis of the doctrine of conflict
of low intensity, in order to also theoretically prove his thesis of
prevailing outside factors. Indirectly he also suggests that the
mentioned American military doctrine he found was tested on the Balkan
military ground: how to break up a multinational state and without
conflict and major victims with different ways of non-fighting
activities, mostly by peace forces of NATO (Unprofor, Ifor, Sfor) which
occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and even force on them Dayton peace!
The
chapter on the scenario or guided or directed destability of SFRJ is of
special interest as well as the condensed and documentary survey on
inner wars in Yugoslavia, especially in Slovenia.
In
October 1990 the author, Major General and chief of staff corps in
Bitola had as the first Slovenian general, left the JLA, because he saw
clearly that one can not fight against his own nation!
SLOVENE MILITARY INTELLIGENTIALS – GENERALS AND ADMIRALS
(Draft for an anthropological study)
SLOVENSKA VOJAŠKA INTELIGENCA – GENERALI IN ADMIRALI (Skica za
antropološko študijo), Borec, štev. 579–582/2000, Ljubljana
The
author discusses the almost forgotten and even ignored topic of Slovene
military intellectuals. In the tree introductory chapters, he first
presents a number of general issues and lexicographic data on the
history of military intelligence, military education and the formation
of the military class, along with fascinating information of military
science as and interdisciplinary branch of scientific research.
The
author proclaimed his own »non-ideological and genetic« list of all
Slovene generals and admirals (255), and at the end, he adds to Slovene
SAZU a proposal for a new class of military science.
In
November 2007 the author published a new list with Slovene generals and
admirals (298).
SLOVENE MILITARY INTELLIGENTSIA
SLOVENSKA VOJAŠKA INTELIGENCA, Ljubljana, 2005
This
is the first book about Slovene military intelligentsia and the foreword
was written by the dr. Iztok Podbregar, Lieutetenant Colonel General,
the former chief of the General staff of the Slovenian army.
The
main part of the article focuses on the beginning of the Slovene
military intelligentsia, which due to historical circumstances were
found in foreign or »joint« national armies, such as first in the
Austro-Hungarian and later in two Yugoslav armies – the Royal and the
Yugoslav People’s Army. The author even proposes four candidates for the
first Slovene general, who served in the »Vojna krajina« (Jernej Basaj,
born 1720), Austro-Hungarian army (Pavel Seničar, 1760 and Josip Novak,
1772) and admiral in the British navy (John Jeffrey Rakovec, 1770)
respectively.
He
also discusses two periods which laid the foundations for the
independent Slovene state, and the Slovene army along with it. The first
was the period from 1918 to 1919, when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes was founded and the war for the Slovene northern border raged,
in which Major General Rudolf Maister distinguished himself, and also
Counter Admiral Metod Koch, who in the same period was entrusted with
the formation of the first Yugoslav navy.
The
second period, from 1941 to 1945, is the time of the National Liberation
Movement and the Slovene partisan army, within which in May 1943 the
first partisan General Major was appointed in the person of Franc Rozman
Stane, the chief of the general staff of the Slovene partisan army.
The
author also mentioned the officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers
and seamen. The author presents their list and a detailed list of
Slovene generals and admirals, folk heroes and well-known soldiers from
the top ranks of the Slovene military intelligentsia.
The
author’s main message is that throughout history, Slovenes have proven
themselves as a nation of rebels and courageous soldiers and seamen,
first-rate officers, holders of decorations, brave men, national heroes,
winners of national awards, inventors, doctors of military and defense
sciences, astronauts and some 250 generals and admirals. The work
presents a solid platform for debate on the Slovene military
intelligentsia and the formation of an authentic Slovene army.
PLOTS AND ATTEMPTS ON TITO’S
ZAROTE IN ATENTATI NA TITA, Ljubljana, 2004
As an author of this book, I was about
30 years in Security service JLA, and I am enough qualified for this
delicate theme.
As an
author of this book, I was about 30 years in the security service JLA,
and I am enough qualified for this delicate theme.
The
western superpowers and the former ZSSR (Soviet Union) from 1945
attempted to liquidate Marshal Tito and with him behead the Social
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ). Probably there be valid my
thesis that Yugoslavia were not disintegrated spontaneously, this was
first distributed by superpowers (Teheran, Potsdam, Casablanca) and then
in a bloody war (1991–1995) break to pieces!
In my
book The Balkan
Military Range, 1998,
I
give proof of the daring thesis that in a so called directed and guided
destability, which was implemented by the methodology of the current
military doctrine of encounters of low intensity doctrine, the outer
factors have always decisive predominance over the interior ones. And
the last phase of this famous »Day – X« can be after Tito's death,
natural or violent. Some merits of them also have the Security service
JLA, which I was a member of.
I
systematically treated all of the known plots and attempts on Tito – 75.
I presented about 18 main plots, although their number is bigger. Once
Tito mentioned about 23 attempts. On methodology of the military secret
service, I treated 57 attempts and classified them as planning (27),
trialing (26) and executing (4) attempts.
All
of these plots and attempts on Titos, a presented in form of three
periods:
a
illegal operation of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia 1928–1941 –
3;
a
leading member of the National Liberation War 1941–1945 – 16;
a
leader of the Social Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and Yugoslav
People Army 1945–1980 – 54.
I
described also two counterintelligence actions abroad in which I took
part. At
the end I concluded that the truth about the plots and attempts on Tito
are still in the archives – here and abroad. Many of the actors were
lying (»medicine attempt« on Brdo and others). Because Tito's mother was
Slovene, I placed him as a Slovene military and political leader, and he
was on the popular ranging on place four in Slovenia (2005).
Many people in Slovenia
do not know, that besides Partisans and Domobranci, Chetniks also
operated in Slovenia during the Italian and German occupation from 1941
till 1945. They were popularly called “The Blue Guard”. Their
Commander-in-chief was General Staff Major (later Colonel) Karl Novak,
sometimes called “vojvoda” i.e. “Duke”, and after September 1943 Colonel
(later general) Ivan Prezelj – Andrej. There were about 300 – 600
Chetniks in central Slovenia and after 1944 about 250 in Štajerska. All
of them collaborated with the Italians and Germans as well.
But in Slovenia the “Chetnik” problem
really appeared after the war. In 1998, the well known dr.Aleksander
Bajt wrote a book entitled “Dossier Bergman” in which he revealed that
he was a Lieutenant in Novak’s Chetnik staff in Italy. Another surprise
was revealed in 2003, to wit: that Leon Stukelj, Slovene Olympic
champion, also was a Chetnik and a British agent. And in 2006, the
revelation came that Hrvoje Maister, one of the sons of general Rudolf
Maister of WWI fame, also was a Chetnik Colonel.
In April of 2006,
Slobodan Kljakić, a reporter from Belgrade, offered me a copy of a
secret report which in 1941, Colonel Karl Novak, the Chetnik Commander
in Slovenia sent to Colonel Živan Knežević, an Adjutant to King Peter.
This document, allegedly was brought from the US to Serbian Chetnik
Major Kosić, who in turn gave it to his friend Bosnić, and he passed it
to Kljakić.
Slobodan Kljakić and
myself decided to publish this report in book form first in Slovenia and
later on in Serbia. The book, edited by “Pro-Andy” was published in May
2006 in Maribor under the title “The Blue Guard – a Secret Report by its
Commander in Chief”. In December 2006, edited by Filip Višnjić, the book
was published in Belgrade, Serbia.
SLOVENE CHETNIKS OF ŠTAJERSKA - GERMAN COLABORANTS?
ŠTAJERSKI ČETNIKI - NEMŠKI KOLABORANTI?
Because of confidentiality of Novak’s
report, the Chetniks of Štajerska were not mentioned in
"The blue guard",
but I searched for details in the Archives of Slovenia.
As a 9 year old boy in
“Slovenske Gorice” I remember meeting a group of Chetniks in October
1944, after they have murdered a woman, serving as parish cook of our
clergyman Alojz Klobasa-Püčko, whose altar-server boy I was.
In September 1943
Colonel Karl Novak left the Chetniks in Slovenia and until that time the
Chetniks of Štajerska were really marginaly group. But historical
documents and memory sources say that Lieutenant Jože Melaher-Zmagoslav,
after some months of German occupation began to gather Slovene boys who
selected him the Štajerska commander. In his memoirs, published in USA,
Melaher, Commander of Štajerska Chetniks, reveals some hitherto not
mentioned facts.
Certainly there is no
mention in his memoirs of him being an agent of Abwehr and, later on of
Gestapo. The first one to admit this in public was his courier and
clergyman Henrik Goricčan, after being arrested by the Gestapo and sent
to Dachau. I learned about the Chetniks from Štajerska from the
bachelor's thesis of Katja Zupanič in 2000 in Maribor. But the most
important data I obtained from Chetnik “Rado”, who also participated in
a chetnik raid in village Sv.Jurij ob Ščavnici in October 1944. He was
also my guest at the presentation of “The Blue Guard” in Maribor.
Rado claims the saddest moment of his life
occurred in January 1945 when Melaher (Zmagoslav) – in his presence –
signed a paper promising his collaboration with the Germans against
Slovene Partisans. In May 1945 Melaher gathered some 250 men from
Štajerska, in addition to some family members, friends and confidants,
altogether some 500 people. Of them some 125 men reached Carinthia, but
only 75 of them, Rado included, reached the British refugee camp in
Italy, where other Slovene Chetniks were being stationed. (In 1947 Rado
returned to Slovenia).
A CHETNIKS
"ATTACK" on a Germany gendarme station in Sv. Jurij ob Ščavnici
Četniški »napad« na nemško
orožniško postajo pri Sv. Juriju ob Ščavnici
In his memoirs, Lieutenant Jože
Melaher-Zmagoslav, Commander of Štajerska Chetniks, speaks also of three
attacks against German forces in Štajerska. On October 21, 1944, as a 9
years old boy, I witnessed one of Chetniks attacks.
In
May 2006, together with the still living Chetnik Rado, we managed to
reconstruct this mishap - not an attack.
Three groups of 1st Chetnik company, according to Rado, were
charged to disarm all of German military policemen at a local police
station. They did so, collecting some 70 rifles and “magazines”.
But Sergeant Franc Ogrizek, company
commander, bent on frightening our parish priest Alojz Klobasa – Püčko,
unintentionally killed the parish’s lady cook. So the result of this
Chetnik raid was a dead female cook and 70 confiscated rifles.
(Note: at the time of the above events,
Joze Melaher was really but a Reserve Sergeant of the Yugoslav Army. He
was promoted Lieutenant only after his arrival in Italy in May of 1945.)
MYSTERY OF DEATH OF CHETNIKS GENERAL DRAŽA MIHAILOVIĆ
Skrivnost smrti četniškega generala
Draže Mihailovića by Slobodan Kljakić - Translated
into Slovenian language and prepared Marijan F. Kranjc
Miodrag - Mija Nikolić, an officer of Yugoslav Ozna, in his
autobiographic book Odraščanje in ideali (Growing and ideals), Niš,
Serbia, 2006, wrote that general Mihailović after death sentence in 1946
was not executed, but he died on 1960 in Moscaw, Soviet Union.
This
sensational news shocked the Serbian people, especially the old chetniks.
But the historians and the old member of KPJ knew that Vladimir Dedijer,
Tito's biographer, in 1972 told that we can only find data about Dragiša
Vasić and Draža Mihailović in the Moscow archives if they were Soviet
Union agents in political or in military intelligence services (GRU).
The colonel Mihailović as a Yugoslav military attaché in Sofia,
Bulgaria, started in 1935 as a secret agent of the Soviet military
attaché general Vasilij Timofejević Suhorukov. But Dragiša Vasić was a
old secret agent of Kominterna …
The
first news about this matter came from the Russian historian dr. Boris
Starkov from Sankt Petersburg University in an international historical
symposium in Spain, 1993. The author of this article, Slobodan Kljakić,
met with dr. Starkov 1995 in Belgrade, where he confirmed his discovery
about general Mihailović and Vasić.
Another Russian historian, Artjom Ulunjan, said in 1998 for Globus in
Zagreb, Croatia that Mustafa Golubić, one of the oldest of the Soviet
secret agents, organized a meeting on 1936 in Carigrad between colonel
Mihailović and Josip Broz Tito, who returned from the Soviet Union to
Yugoslavia.
In
1940 Mustafa Golubić became a chief of the Soviet Union spy network in
Yugoslavia (and Balkan) and he sent Dragiša Vasić to the chetnics' staff
in Ravna Gora and organized two meetings. Tito – Mihailović in June
1941. After that time Mustafa Golubić was arrested by the Gestapo and
killed.
After
the end of the second world war, in November 1945, Ozna captured colonel
Nikola Kalabić, a former commander of the Mountain Kings Guard, who
agreed to play Ozna a „big game“ – in March 1946 a team of Ozna men and
Kalabić found general Mihailović in a small village called Dobruna.
Surprisingly, general Mihailović was in Ozna prison in Belgrade on May,
13th 1946.
Before that Tito and Kardelj agreed that general Mihailović can go
freely to the West, but another Yugoslav politician said that they must
organize a spectacular people court!
Some
of the chetnic prisoners were not executed. Dragi Jovanović, a chief of
Special Polices in Belgrade, was alive tree years and helped Udba.
Perhaps Stalin, a great chief of the Soviet Union, did not forget his
man – general Mihailović! As already said Tito and Kardelj: "General
Mihailović was not send to the West, but to East!"
Ozna
said to Branko, a partisan and the oldest son of general Mihailović,
that his father was alive until 1953 in Sarajevo near Belgrade. A great
wish of the old chetnics is to see Mihailović in a grave in the House of
flowers in Belgrade ... nearby Tito's.
THE
LIFE WITH LEKA - THE TRUTH ABOUT BRION PLENUM
Življenje z Leko (spomini slovenske
partizanke - prof. dr. Ladislave Becele Ranković) by prof. dr. Ladislava Becela
Ranković - Translated from serbian language, edited and redacted by Marijan F. Kranjc
During the NATO attack on Beograd a group of friends of mine searched my
book The Balkan Military Polygon (1998) in which I wrote that the real
destablities of Yugoslavia began in the middle of 1966 with an assembly
»brion plenum« (Brion Meeting), when Aleksandar Ranković, a Tito deputy,
was suspended. In this time the national security system of the
Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) was destroyed, and
after that Slobodan Milošević destabilized the Comunist Party, the
Yugoslav Army and the state.
When
the Admiral Stanislav Brovet said to his neighbor prof. dr. Slavka
Becele Ranković that a Slovene general wrote the plain truth about »brion
plenum«, the Slovene partisan and the former second Lady of Yugoslavia,
she send to me her book The Life with Leka, in Serbian language and
Cyrillic alphabet, also with dedication and thanks. After that I decided
to translate her book into Slovene language. I wrote a foreword and
added new documents, first of all a testimony by Colonel Dušan Rusić,
also my former chief, who said the truth about »brion plenum«. In my
opinion that was a strategic Soviet Union's intelligence operation
against Yugoslavia and Tito respectively against UDBA and Ranković.
It
was known that Kominterna (and her successor) never forgave his members'
and co-operators disloyalty, so it is very probable that in this case
there was a vengeance of the Soviet intelligence services against Tito
because of the case of Informbiro, for one of the perfect and inventive
action to compromise the UDBA and personality Aleksanader Ranković, one
of Tito's most loyal friends!
About
this there were new facts and documents which I added to the Slovene
translation. First, there were Ivan Kreačić – Stevo, former chief od
NKVD center for Yugoslavia, the main manager of »brion plenum«, with
other political adherents in the pitch of the Comunist Party (Kardelj,
Bakarić, Stambolić, Crvenkovski), chiefs of civilian and military
securities services (brothers Milan and Ivan Mišković, generalcolonel)
and with a operative-technical support and »proofs« from Croatia (a
telephone of Jovanka and a false connections to Ranković villas).
